By: Wonderr K. Freeman, Attorney, CFCS

There is no shortage of regional economic institutions in Africa. There is SADC in the south, AMU in the North, EAC in the East and ECOWAS in the West, and many more. The fact remains that these institutions are so many, and so overlapping, that they are referred to as a spaghetti bowl. Quite a number of these institutions are either defunct or just some staging forum for Africa’s “big men” to gather and utter some diplomatic blah, blah, blah, and then wine and dine. However, ECOWAS has been, undisputedly, one of the more functional and moderately successful regional economic organizations. There are some measures of free movement (without the labor mobility portion [sadly]). There is the common passport project and a regional court, notwithstanding the challenges of implementing the court’s decisions. ECOWAS also implemented some laudable regional actions to stop civil wars in some member states (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone) and prevented civil unrest in The Gambia . ECOWAS has a working standardized tariff policy, many regional financial institutions, and a ongoing commitment to a common currency. It also has an enviable power purchase agreement that allows energy trade (ref. WAPP and ERERA ). In short, ECOWAS has many things to be proud of. Lately, however, there is an unfortunate schism in the group, with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger splintering from the bloc to form a separate and possibly rival regional bloc – which, ostensibly, is bad news for everyone in the subregion.

Why was the schism implemented so seamlessly?
Notwithstanding ECOWAS’ laudable track record as a regional institution, the level of integration is still deficient – when compared to the European Union – which is the undisputed gold standard of regional economic integration. I say deficient because at least three of its member-states have defected and are seeking to form a rival regional institution – the Alliance of Sahel States. It is now common knowledge that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have opted to create a rival regional economic bloc, comprising of at least 73 million people -with a combined GDP of nearly USD $60 billion . Effectively, this bloc is a 60 billion-dollar market splintering from ECOWAS. This is not something for the regional bloc to waive. But why are they splintering? As I see it, notwithstanding its successes, ECOWAS, in economic terms, has not permeated its member-states sufficiently enough – to raise the cost of defection. If ECOWAS had been far more integrated, this would have raised the cost of defection – so much so that countries tinkering with the idea of splintering from the group would have taken a pause to soberly reflect on the “cost of splintering”. From an outsider’s perspective, it does seem that these nations made their decision without second thoughts. Could it be that throughout their membership in ECOWAS, they did not realize the expected economic and other benefits of their membership? Could it be that the regional bloc’s myriad incomplete integration projects (e.g., common currency, road networks, intra-regional trade deals, etc.), institutions, and lax enforcement of the Community’s decisions led to a situation in which countries don’t readily see the benefits of their membership? If this theory holds true, then it is, perhaps understandably, that a handful of member-states would, without much consideration, swiftly pull their countries out of the regional bloc – rationalizing that there is not much to lose, after all.

Global relevance is a matter of scale
ECOWAS seeks global relevance – like any other regional bloc. There is nothing wrong about having grand ambitions. But when the African continent (as a whole) currently represents no more than 2-4% of the global economy and global trade, you have a genuine problem with global relevance. Global relevance cannot be achieved by fiat. You can’t legislate it. It must be meticulously engineered; it must be earned. But if the entire Africa is such a minuscule percentage of the global GDP and global trade, splintering our regional blocs further is one sure way to get to global irrelevance. Economics is not the only path to global relevance, yet every other known measure is some function of economics. For example, one can get global relevance via technology (e.g., Taiwan), scientific knowledge (e.g., EU, USA, UK), and military prowess (Russia, North Korea). But, as far as I see it, every other measure is a function of economics. North Korea is an anomaly, perhaps to have a strong military (with nuclear weapons and all that) while simultaneously having a struggling economy. Generally, you can’t acquire any of these other measures without a good functional economy. Again, global relevance is not achieved by fiat. If anything, ECOWAS needs more integration –trade/supply chain networks and more markets. The Sahelian schism represents a rear march in this regard. It’s high time ECOWAS musters all its energies to bring back the defecting members into the fold.

There is still time and opportunity for reintegration
The initial cause of the disaffection was coup d’états in these countries that were denounced by ECOWAS – Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2021, 2022), Niger (2023). However, ECOWAS’s response triggered a backlash from the referenced countries. It is known that ECOWAS has made some diplomatic efforts to end the schism. So far, nothing has worked. However, I think a three-track approach should prove more successful. Firstly, ECOWAS must complete all its regional integration projects, of which there are many. Responding with more economic integration that engenders more benefits for current members of the bloc will, firstly, prevent other member-states from threading the Sahelian Alliance’s path. This measure could equally give the defecting states enough “food for thought” as to what they are missing out by splintering. Secondly, ECOWAS can continue courting civil society in these states. As things stand, the defectors are all military governments. Given the inherent instability of military regimes, it’s difficult to predict who will be in power in the next two or three years. Assuming these regimes turned over to civilians at some point sooner, this will put ECOWAS in a better position to leverage its past efforts with civil society and success with reintegration. Even without explicitly turning over to civilian governments, some of these military governments could take the well-threaded path of dropping the military fatigues for civilian suits. As this point, the erstwhile military leaders will need to build a much broader coalition and may, by then, be more amenable to reintegration into the bloc. Ultimately, ECOWAS must treat this schism as an existential threat, as that is exactly what it is. Thirdly, ECOWAS can also explore external interlocutors. There are, of course, many African elder statesmen (from North Africa, to Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa) who can work around the clock until a resolution is found. Alternatively, and probably somewhat unorthodox, is to look outside Africa for interlocutors. There is China, Russia, or Brazil (perhaps?) – global powers that some of the defecting Sahelian military leaders are keen on forging new partnerships. Make no mistakes about this; this Sahelian schism is an existential threat to ECOWAS. When faced with an existential threat, nonchalance or resignation should definitely not be an option.

About the Author

Wonderr K. Freeman is a Liberian Investment Attorney, Political Economist, Accountant, and Certified Financial Crimes Specialist (CFCS) currently based in Minneapolis, USA. Mr. Freeman’s professional interests span the intersection of law and economics, including the political economy of development, economic justice, international trade/investment law, and financial crimes law. He can be reached at [email protected]. He blogs at https://wonderrfreeman.com